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RESPONDENTS' BRIEF 
STATEMENT OF FACT^ 
Dennis Jacobsen is a general contractor engaged in the 
construction of residential and small commercial buildings (R. 
89-90). He generally contracts out approximately 80% of a project 
including the mechanical, electrical, framing, roofirg, sheetrock. 
painting and carpentry to subcontractors. The remaining 20% 
consists of "the contractor's portion of the...job. plus all of the 
...odds and ends - cleanup, sweeping the job, maybe 
[the]...footings..." and "sometimes11 the carpentry work itself (R. 
96) . 
Towards the end of 1984, Jacobsen hired £ruce Ring as his 
employee and paid him a hourly wage to do the carpentry work on his 
projects (R. 66-67). After about six months as his employee, Ring 
began to subcontract "little jobs" for Jacobsen (R. 67-74). In July 
of 1985, Ring hired Mark Pugh (R. 55) to "expedite" the completion 
of one of Jacobsen's projects (R. 68). That project consisted of a 
"hot tub/greenhouse addition on a residential home in Summit Park" 
(R. 68). While Ring had previously completed "a couple of little 
jobs for" Jacobsen as a subcontractor, this project was the first 
where Ring hired employees to assist him. After completion of the 
Summit Park project. Ring and Pugh began working on another one of 
Jacobsen1s projects, a garage and addition to a residence in the 
avenues district of Salt Lake City. Pugh was injured on October 2, 
1985, while working on the avenues project after having been 
employed by Ring for approximately three months. 
As to his subcontractor relationship with Jacobsen, Ring 
testified to the following pertinent facts: 
1. Jacobsen had overall responsibility for the project (R. 76). 
2. Jacobsen had "total control" over Ring's work (R. 69) and 
how things were going from day to day (R. 89). 
3. Jacobsen was Ring's "direct boss" (R. 68). 
4. Jacobsen visited the job site between two and five times per 
week, sometimes staying all day (R. 69). 
5. When Jacobsen visited the job site it was to give "specific 
instructions" and later to see that those instructions were being 
carried out (R. 70). 
6. Jacobsen made changes in the way Ring was constructing the 
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project "basically every time he came" to the site (R. 70-71). 
7. Jacobsen asked Ring to hire more employees to "speed up the 
[avenues] job" which Ring did (R. 82-83). 
8. Jacobsen instructed Ring on which jihase of the carpentry 
should be completed "next" (R. 84). 
9. Ring felt obligated to follow Jacobsen's suggestions (R. 84) 
10. Jacobsen gave Mark Pugh "suggestions" on how to do a piece 
of carpentry (R. 92). 
11. Had Jacobsen not liked the job Pugh was doing and asked 
Ring to fire him. Ring would have done so (R. 80). 
12. During the entire time Ring had "known or been associated 
with Jacobsen", he did not work for any other general contractors 
(R. 76-77). 
13. Jacobsen didn't give Ring any more instructions during the 
time Ring was his hourly employee than when he was subcontracting 
(R. 86). 
14. "A general contractor [Jacobsen] acquires a job by 
submitting a bid. He can then sub out certain aspects of that and 
he is in charge of the entire job and everybody that comes on to 
that job" (R. 68). 
Jacobsen testified that he requested tha 
day's work and that if Jacobsen told Ring to 
t Ring put in a full 
make changes in the 
"specs" which required extra time, Jacobsen paid Ring by the hour 
for those changes or completed them himself 
Throughout his testimony, Jacobsen never ind 
with Ring's previous testimony regarding the 
(R. 98, 100). 
|Lcated that he disagreed 
i r working r e l a t i onsh ip . 
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
No err was committed below in finding: 
1. That Mark Pugh was Dennis Jacobsen's statutory employee, 
2. That Bruce Ring and Jacobsen are jointly and severally 
liable for Pugh's benefits. 
3. That the Uninsured Employers" Fund is not liable as a 
surety for Ring. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION DID NOT ERR IN FINDING 
PUGH TO BE THE STATUTORY EMPLOYEE OF JACOBSEN. 
On September 30, 1986, the Supreme Court of Utah filed its 
opinion in Case Number 20705, Robert N. Bennett v. Industrial 
Commission of Utah, Johnson Brothers Construction and C. L. Matthews 
Construction. After reviewing the history of the statutory employee 
provision in Section 35-1-42(2) (U.C.A., 1953, as amended) the Court 
articulated guidelines for determining whether a statutory 
employer/employee relationship exists. The facts surrounding the 
Jacobsen/Ring/Pugh relationship bring this case squarely within the 
Bennett decision, which is thus controlling. 
In Bennett, Johnson Brothers Construction subcontracted to 
replace a concrete driveway on a remodeling project where C. L. 
Matthews Construction was the general contractor. Johnson Brothers 
in turn "contacted11 Bennett and another individual and "asked them 
1The name of the Default Indemnity Fund was changed to the 
Uninsured Employers' Fund in 1986. The Fund is referred to by its 
new name in this brief. 
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if they would like to do the job for a setjsum." (Bennett, supra, 
at p. 1) Johnson Brothers characterized Bennett as an independent 
contractor and the Industrial Commission agreed, thereby denying him 
workers1 compensation benefits. The Supreme Court disagreed with 
the Commission and found that Bennett was in fact an employee of 
defendant Johnson Brothers Construction. 
The Supreme Court then addressed the isl sue of whether or not 
Bennett was a statutory employee of Matthews, the general 
ide the issue, instead 
termination, the Court 
contractor. Although the Court did not dec: 
remanding the case to the Commission for del 
did analyze Section 35-1-42(2) and set fortn the following criteria 
to be used in determining whether or not the statutory requirements 
had been met: 
Under Section 35-1-42(2), a subcontractor's 
employee is deemed an employee of the general"" 
contractor if (1) the general contractor retains 
some supervision or control over tlie 
subcontractors work, and (2) the work done by 
the subcontractor is a "part or process in the 
trade or business of the employer.'^ [Emphasis in 
original] 
A subcontractor's work is "part 
the trade or business of the employj 
part of the operations which direct 
the successful performance of the g| 
contractor's commercial enterprise 
business of a general contractor in 
construction business is constructi 
or process in 
er," if it is 
ly relate to 
eneral 
The trade or 
the 
on, and any 
portion of the general contractor's construction 
project which is subcontracted out will 
ordinarily be considered "part or process in the 
trade or business of" the general contractor. 
[Emphasis supplied] 
The requirement in Section 35-1-42(2) that the 
general contractor, as a "statutory employer," 
retain "supervision or control" over the work of 
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the subcontractor who hired the "statutory 
employee" cannot, by definition, be equated with 
the common law standard for determining whether a 
person is an employee or an independent 
contractor. In dealing with "statutory" 
employees, the statute begins with the 
proposition that the claimant qualifies as an 
employee of the subcontractor. But the statutory 
requirement that the general contractor have 
"supervision or control" over the work of the 
subcontractor cannot mean that the subcontractor 
must also qualify as an employee of the general 
contractor. That would be at least highly 
improbable and perhaps impossible by definition. 
Rather, the term "supervision or control" 
requires only that the general contractor retain 
ultimate control over the project. [Emphasis 
supplied] 
Although the construction process requires the 
general contractor to delegate to a greater or 
lesser degree to subcontractors, the general 
contractor remains responsible for successful 
completion of the entire project and of necessity 
retains the right to require that subcontractors 
perform according to specifications. The power 
to supervise or control the ultimate performance 
of subcontractors satisfies the requirement that 
the general contractor retain supervision or 
control over the subcontractor. Therefore, as 
long as a subcontractor's work is a part or 
process of the general contractor's business, an 
inference arises that the general contractor has 
retained supervision or control over the 
subcontractor sufficient to meet the requirement 
of Section 35-1-42(2). 
Finally, we note that the remedial purpose of the 
Workmen's Compensation Act supports the 
conclusion that Section 35-1-42(2) should be 
construed in favor of protecting the employee. 
Ring was a carpenter providing the carpentry work on Jacobsen's 
projects. Jacobsen sometimes did the carpentry himself. Jacobsen 
remained responsible for the successful completion of the entire 
project. He also retained the right, and in fact exercised ultimate 
supervision and control over Ring in seeing to it that he 
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ctor on the project in 
ity for the project and 
performed according to specifications. 
Applying the Bennett criteria to the Jacobsen/Ring relationship, 
it is clear that Pugh was Jacobsen1s statutory employee. As to the 
first requirement of the definition, supervision or control, there 
is no evidence in the record below to contradict Ring's testimony 
regarding Jacobsen*s role as general contrac 
question. Jacobsen had overall responsibil: 
"total control" over Ring's work on a day-tjo-day basis. In fact, 
Jacobsen exercised the same degree of control (through the giving of 
instructions) over Ring as his subcontractor as he had exercised 
when Ring was his hourly employee (R. 86). Although respondents 
contend the Jacobsen/Ring relationship satisfies all of the 
supervision and control standards enunciated in the earlier cases 
cited by Jacobsen in his brief, those cases are irrelevant in light 
of Bennett and there is therefore no need to exhaustively examine 
those cases now. The Jacobsen/Ring relationship clearly meets the 
supervision or control standard enunciated i) 
The second requirement of the statutory 
that Ring's work was "part or process in the| 
Jacobsen, has also been met by the facts in 
trade or business, as a general contractor i 
business, is construction. A portion of the 
n Bennett. 
employee definition, 
trade or business of" 
this case. Jacobsen's 
n the construction 
avenues project was the 
carpentry which Jacobsen subcontracted put to Ring. Thus Ring was 
engaged in work which was "part or process i|i the trade or business 
of" Jacobsen, the general contractor. 
Jacobsen argues on appeal that carpentryIwas not "part or 
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process" of the construction business because the carpentry work was 
not "ordinarily accomplished with his own employees." (Appellant's 
brief at p. 17) Jacobsen cites Lee v. Chevron Oil Company, Utah, 
565 P.2d 1128 (1977), in support of this assertion. In Lee, the 
plaintiffs "were employed by Oaks Construction Company. Oaks was 
engaged on an hourly basis to clean storage tanks for [Chevron Oil 
Company] defendant." (Lee, supra, at p. 1129.) In upholding the 
trial court's decision that the plaintiffs were statutory employees 
of Chevron, the Supreme Court did, in fact, use the language cited 
in Jacobsen's brief. However, the entire paragraph and the 
accompanying footnote are essential to understand the Court's 
meaning. 
"In San Isabel Electric Association, Inc. v. Bramer the 
court in discussing the 'statutory employer' statute stated 
the legislative intent was to prevent employers from 
evading compensation coverage by contracting out work 
instead of directly hiring the workmen. Thus the statute 
covers all situations in which the subcontracted work is 
such a part of the constructive employer's regular business 
operation as he would ordinarily accomplish with is own 
employees.10 
10
...But, with a surprising degree of harmony, the 
cases applying these assorted phrases agree upon the 
general rule of thumb that the statute covers all 
situations in which work is accomplished which this 
employer, or employers in a similar business, would 
ordinarily do through employees...." Also see Howard v. 
Vulcan Materials Company, (5 Cir. 1974), 294 F.2d 1183, 
1184, wherein the court stated that contracted work is a 
part of the principal's trade, business, or occupation if 
it is so necessary to its operation that save for the 
contractor, it would have to hire workers of its own to 
perform the task. 
Citations omitted , Lee, supra, at p. 1131, [emphasis 
supplied.] 
When read in context, the Lee test is not, did Jacobsen 
_a_ 
ordinarily hire his own employees to perfoxjm the carpentry work on a 
project, but rather was the carpentry work Iso necessary to 
Jacobsen's construction business that he "would have to hire workers 
of his own to perform the task" save for subcontracting to Ring. It 
can't be argued that Jacobsen could construct a building without 
carpentry work being performed. 
POINT II 
THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION DID NOJT ERR IN FINDING 
JACOBSEN ULTIMATELY LIABLE AND RELIEVING THE 
UNINSURED EMPLOYERS' FUND OF LIABILITY 
Jacobsen objects to the Commission's finding of joint and 
several liability and argues, in Point II or his brief, that the 
Commission should have found Ring primarily liable and Jacobsen 
secondarily liable. Since the Industrial Commission did in fact 
conclude that Jacobsen would only be liable in the event of Ring's 
default and then with full rights of subrogation against Ring, (R. 
152-153) this point on appeal is merely a pijelude to the ultimate 
issue as raised in Jacobsen's Point III. 
Respondents agree with Jacobsen's argument that if the immediate 
employer (Ring) had been covered by workers' 
or able to pay the award, the statutory empl< 
not be required to reimburse Ring or his carp 
the award. In that sense. Ring should be primarily liable and 
Jacobsen secondarily liable as the Commissioh held below. Jacobsen 
incorrectly concludes however, that having made this distinction, 
the Uninsured Employers' Fund stands in as the surety for Rina and 
compensation insurance 
oyer (Jacobsen) should 
rier for a portion of 
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pays Pugh's award. Under this theory, advanced in Point III of 
Jacobsen's brief, a statutory employer escapes liability 
altogether. In addressing that issue on Jacobsen's Motion for 
Review, the Industrial Commission correctly held that 
"If the legislature had wanted the [Uninsured Employers1 
Fund] to take the place of 'statutory' employers, the 
legislature would have repealed the 'statutory employer' 
section of U. C. A. 35-1-42, when the [Uninsured Employers' 
Fund] legislation was passed. As the legislature did not 
do so, the Commission finds the [Uninsured Employers' Fund] 
was not intended to replace statutory employers." (R. 169) 
It is not on the mere failure on the part of the legislature to 
repeal this provision that the analysis of this issue should rest. 
The statutory employer provision serves functions apart from and 
beyond that of a "deep pocket" for the protection of employees in 
workers' compensation law. While it is true under Jacobsen's 
argument that employees would be compensated for their injuries, he 
fails to address the ramifications of abandoning statutory liability 
altogether. 
A. 
Statutory employers are uniquely situated to 
insure compliance with the mandatory insurance 
provision of Section 35-1-46. 
The construction industry has perhaps the highest uninsured rate 
in the nation and is one of the most difficult to police for 
compliance with the mandatory insurance provisions of Section 
35-1-46. There is generally no physical location (like with 
restaurants or manufacturing plants) but rather the job sites are 
scattered throughout the state and move upon completion of each 
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project. This makes it impossible to "clofee down" a construction 
company pursuant to a cease and desist order. The seasonal nature 
of most construction companies complicate Enforcement. Provided a 
company can be identified as an uninsured entity and successfully 
prosecuted, by the time a court order is in effect the company has 
ceased operations for the winter. If the general contractor 
subcontracts a substantial portion of his Work, expensive and 
exhaustive discovery and trial time would be necessary to establish 
the actual working relationships between the contractor, his 
subcontractors and their employees. Obtain ing witnesses "against" 
the subcontractors in an attempt to prove nbn-compliance has, in the 
prosecution. The 
that he has no 
past, proven to be an impossible barrier to 
subcontractor invariably raises the defense 
employees, only independent contractors, requiring that the employee 
come to court and testify against the person who signs his check and 
thereby provides his livelihood. In practicality it does not help 
to say that the employee can be subpoenaed since the employee will 
all too well understand that his testimony n|eans his job. 
The Industrial Commissions greatest ally in this battle is the 
general contractor. Knowing that ultimate 1: 
him, the general contractor "has it within hp 
responsible subcontractors "and insist upon appropriate compensation 
protection for their workers." (1C A. Larson, Workmen1s 
Compensation Law, Section 49.14 [1986], as cited with approval in 
Bennett, supra, at p. 5.) Without the help <bf the general 
contractor who can require that his subcontractors obtain and 
iability will rest with 
is power" to choose 
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maintain insurance, the Industrial Commission has a difficult if not 
impossible task in discovering and prosecuting the subcontractors to 
enforce compliance. 
B. 
The statutory employer provision prevents 
evasion of compensation coverage by the 
subcontracting of the employers' normal work. 
The construction business is a high risk industry. The very 
nature of the work involves the potential for serious, debilitating 
and costly injuries. Because of that, workers' compensation 
insurance premiums are considerably higher in this industry than in 
most others. This is also a business which lends itself to the 
subcontracting of the majority of the high risk work involved. If 
the appellant prevails on this issue, there would be no statutory 
employer liability. Every general contractor would thus be 
encouraged to get their employees off of their insurance policies by 
calling them subcontractors or employees of their subcontractors. 
By avoiding the premium payment, the general contractor could offer 
a portion of that savings to the "subcontractor" thereby increasing 
his wages, an offer most would not turn down. In the event one of 
his subcontractors was injured on the job, the general contractor, 
under the independent contractor/employee test in Bennett, supra, 
would in all likelihood be found liable for the subcontractor's 
injuries. The subcontractor would thus in a sense be "covered" for 
any injury he sustained on the job and the general contractor would 
insulate himself from liability for all injuries sustained by the 
employees of the subcontractor. A profitable arrangement for both 
-12-
the general contractor and his subcontractors and a very expensive 
one for the Uninsured Employers' Fund. 
The Uninsured Employers1 Fund liacks the funding 
necessary to underwrite the workers1 compensation 
coverage for the entire construction industry, 
i 
Without the statutory employer provision as advocated by 
appellant, this high risk industry, impossible to police and with a 
I 
disincentive to insure, would look to the Already inadequate 
or benefits. Becoming 
rs to call it) for this 
reserves of the Uninsured Employers' Fund fi< 
the insurer (or "surety" as appellant prefei 
entire industry could not have been the intent of the legislature 
when the Uninsured Employers' Fund was created. Had the legislature 
intended such a result, it would have provided more adequate funding 
and reserves. 
There are over twenty-five Uninsured Employers' Funds throughout 
the country. Most are funded in one of four ways: 
1. An annual pro rata assessment against each insured employer 
equal to all of the expenses of the Uninsured Employers' Fund as 
in Ohio, Pennsylvania, Nevada, North Dakota, Connecticut, Kansas 
and others. 
2. A minimum 1% premium tax on all insujred employers as in 
Arizona and Maryland for example. 
3. A $70,000 non-dependent death benefit with general state tax 
revenues for all amounts needed above that benefit. California 
is the only state which uses general state tax revenue for the 
funding of its Uninsured Employers' Fund4 
4* The non-dependent death benefit as tl^ e sole source of 
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funding as in Montana only. 
As it was first enacted, the Uninsured Employers' Fund in Utah 
fit into the last category above. In 1985, an informal survey of 
funding was conducted of similar funds in other states and Montana 
was the only other fund identified as receiving all of its revenue 
from the non-dependent death benefit. Although Montana's 
non-dependent death benefit is lower than Utah's, Montana declared 
its fund insolvent in 1981, two years after its creation, and has 
paid no benefits to employees since that date. In response to these 
findings, new funding legislation was introduced during the 1986 
Utah Legislative Session as HB300. As that Bill was originally 
written. Section 31A-3-201(2)(a) would have been amended to provide 
an ongoing 1% premium tax for the Uninsured Employers' Fund. As 
amended on the floor of the House of Representatives however, the 
Fund will receive a 1/2% premium tax for only one year, July 1, 
1986, to July 1, 1987. It is anticipated that this will generate 
income to the fund of approximately $450,000.00. After July 1, 
1987f the only funding source will again be the non-dependent death 
benefit. Thus, based on the experience of other states, it is 
believed that the Uninsured Employers' Fund is presently 
2 
underfunded. If the Uninsured Employers' Fund is allowed to 
function as a safety net, providing benefits to employees where no 
employer can be held liable, funds will be available for a longer 
2Estimates on the number of uninsured employers in Utah run as 
high as 25%. This figure is based on the number of known insureds 
versus the number of employers reporting wages paid to Job Service 
for unemployment tax purposes and a random analysis of businesses 
listed in the Salt Lake City "Yellow Pages". 
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period of time, perhaps indefinitely with (adequate enforcement of 
the mandatory insurance provisions of the code. However, if the 
Uninsured Employers1 Fund becomes the "insurer" for Ring and those 
subcontractors who are similarly situated,| the present funding level 
will be exhausted at a more rapid rate. 
When compounded by the enforcement problems attenuate to the 
abolition of the statutory employer provision and the disincentive 
to general contractors to obtain insurance, the problem will 
escalate to crisis proportions before the ijext construction season 
is completed. With the Uninsured Employers' Fund unable to pay 
claims, the statutory employer may again be liable, but at what 
expense to future claimants against the fund? With its funds 
exhausted by the construction industry, thel Uninsured Employers' 
Fund, which is also charged with statewide enforcement of the 
mandatory insurance provisions of the code, will have no resources 
from which to pay the administrative costs associated with 
enforcement. No enforcement will triggfer less compliance. Less 
compliance means more claims against the Fund. It is difficult to 
imagine that this was the intent of the legislature. 
D. 
Jacobsen1s 
employer has 
complaint 
a "double 
that 
burd 
funding structure is 
aj 
en 
unf 
statuto 
11
 under 
true. 
ry 
the 
Jacobsen complains that under the funding structure of the 
Uninsured Employers' Fund, a statutory employer has a "double 
burden" by paying into the fund yet being forced to pay claims for 
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his statutory employees and thus getting no benefit. A brief 
examination of that funding structure proves this is not the case. 
Section 31A-3-201(2)(a)(b) (U.C.A., 1953, as amended) imposes a 
1/2% premium tax on insured employers. Even had the tax been in 
effect during the time period in question, i.e., October 2, 1985, 
Jacobsen can not complain because he would not have paid the tax. 
Neither Pugh nor Ring were covered under Jacobsen1s policy. 
Statutory employees are by definition not covered under the general 
contractors policy. Therefore, since Jacobsen did not pay premiums 
to cover Pugh, he likewise did not pay and would not pay a premium 
tax under Section 31A-3-201(2)(a)(b). 
Section 35-1-68(2)(a) is the non-dependent death benefit which 
is a funding source for "special funds" throughout the country. The 
benefit in Utah provides that in the event an employee dies as a 
result of an on-the-job injury and the employee leaves no 
dependents, the employer is required to pay a set amount into the 
Uninsured Employers1 Fund. Prior to 1984 this benefit was paid into 
the Second Injury Fund. This benefit is less than 1/2 the maximum 
benefit payable had the employee died leaving dependents. In a 
sense, it equals out a windfall to employers who would otherwise pay 
nothing when an employee who had no dependents died as the result of 
a job related injury. Were it not for the non-dependent death 
benefit, employers could cut their losses by unlawfully 
discriminating against employees with dependents hiring instead 
single, childless individuals. 
Additionally, it is not only the insured employer who is 
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required to pay this benefit. Uninsured employees are also liable 
to the Fund for the identical benefit in tlhe event of a 
non-dependent death. The law does not discriminate against insured 
employers. 
Finally, the insured employer benefits!from the existence of an 
Uninsured Employers1 Fund. Prior to the enactment of Section 
35-1-107 (U.C.A., 1953, as amended) there was virtually no 
enforcement of the mandatory insurance provisions of the law. An 
employees uninsured competitor could consistently underbid or 
underprice the insured employer through evasion of the law. The 
likelihood of prosecution or even detectionj made evasion attractive 
to the unscrupulous competitor. The creation of the Uninsured 
Employers* Fund provided funding to hire the staff necessary to 
enforce compliance. The sums paid by an insured employer to the 
Uninsured Employers' Fund admittedly are used to pay the claims of 
employees whose employers were not insured, but they are also used 
to insure a fair marketplace in which the insured employer can 
rs. 
air where a benefit is 
compete on an equal footing with all employe] 
Jacobsen seems to argue that no tax is f< 
conferred on an individual in an amount which is disproportionate to 
that individual's contribution. Every tax and every fund, including 
general revenue funds, are designed to spread the "burden" of 
desired services among those who benefit from the service and those 
who are best able to pay for the services. The present debate over 
how to fund public education is but one example. Childless 
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individuals, because they are not afforded exemptions, arguably pay 
a higher share of educating children than do couples with many 
children. Taxing structures are not designed to provide absolute 
equality in terms of amount paid and benefit received. 
SUMMARY 
Appellant failed to raise any issue of merit in his Writ of 
Review. The Industrial Commission's Order should be affirmed. 
Respectfully submitted this ^7 day of December, 1986. 
^ / ^ ^ — -
suzan Pixton 
Attorney for Respondents 
Uninsured Employers' Fund 
The Industrial Commission of Utah 
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35-1-107. Default Indemnity Fund - (1) There 
is created a Default Indemnity Fijind for the purpose 
of paying and assuring, to persons entitled to, 
workers' compensation benefits when an employer 
becomes insolvent, appoints or | has appointed a 
receiver, or otherwise does not have sufficient 
funds, insurance, sureties, or other security to 
cover workers' compensation liabilities under this 
chapter. If it becomes necessary to pay benefits, 
the fund will be liable for all obligations of the 
employer as set forth in Chapters 1 and 2, Title 35. 
(2) Funds for the Default Indemnity Fund are to 
be provided pursuant to Subsectiori 35-1-68 (2) (a). 
The state treasurer shall be the] custodian of the 
Default Indemnity Fund and the |commission shall 
direct its distribution. Reasonable costs of 
administration may be paid from the fund. The 
attorney general shall appoint a member of his staff 
to represent the Default Indemnity Fund in all pro-
ceedings brought to enforce claims against or on 
behalf of the fund. 
(3) To the extent of the compensation and other 
benefits paid or payable to an Employee or their 
dependents from the Default Indemnity Fund, the 
fund, by subrogation, has all the rights, powers, 
and benefits of the employee or their dependents 
against the employer failing to make the 
compensation payments. 
-" (4) The receiver, trustee, liquidator, or sta-
tutory successor of an insolvent employer shall be 
bound by settlements of covered claims by the fund. 
The court having jurisdiction shall grant all pay-
ments made under this section a priority equal to 
that to which the claimant would have been entitled 
in the absence of this section against the assets of 
the insolvent employer. The expenses of the fund in 
handling claims shall be accorded the same priority 
as the liquidators expenses. 
(5) The commission shall periodically file with 
the receiver, trustee, or liquidator of the 
insolvent employer or insurance carrier statements 
of the covered claims paid by the ft^ nd and estimates 
21 
o^f anticipated claims against the fund which shall 
preserve the rights of the fund for claims against 
'the assets of the insolvent employer. 
[ (6) When any injury or death for which com-
pensation is payable from the Default Indemnity Fund 
has been caused by the wrongful act or neglect of 
another person not in the same employment, the fund 
has the same rights as allowed under Section 35-1-62. 
(7) The fund, subject to approval of the 
Workers* Compensation Division of the Industrial 
Commission, shall discharge its obligations by 
adjusting its own claims or contracting with an 
adjusting company, risk management company, 
insurance company, or other company that has 
expertise and capabilities in adjusting and paying 
workers* compensation claims. 
(8) For the purpose of maintaining this fund, 
the commission, upon rendering a decision with 
respect to any claim from the Default Indemnity Fund 
for compensation under this chapter, shall impose a 
penalty against the employer of 15% of the total 
award made in the claim and shall direct that the 
additional penalty be paid into the fund. Awards 
may be docketed as other awards under this chapter. 
(9) The liability of the state, the Industrial 
Commission, and the state treasurer, with respect to 
payment of any compensation benefits, expenses, 
fees, or disbursement properly chargeable against 
the fund, is limited to the assets in the fund, and 
they are not otherwise in any way liable for the 
making of any payment. 
(10) The commission may make reasonable rules 
for the processing and payment of claims for com-
pensation out of the fund. 
22 
APPENDIX 2 
Sect ion 35-1-68(2) (a) U.C.A.I 
23 
(2) If injury causes death within the period of six years from the date oi 
the accident, the employer or insurance carrier shall pay the burial ex-
penses of the deceased as provided in § 35-1-81, and further benefits in the 
amounts; and to the persons as follows: ; 
(a) If the commission has made a determination that there are no 
dependents of the deceased, it may, prior to a lapse of one year from the 
date of death of a deceased employee, issue a temporary order for the 
employer or insurance carrier to pay into the Uninsured Employers' 
Fund the sum of $30,000. When the amount in the Uninsured Em-
ployers' Fund reaches or exceeds $500,000, the $30,000 shall thereafter 
be paid into the Second Injury Fund* If the amount in the Uninsured 
Employers' Fund falls below $500,000 at any time after reaching the 
initial $500,000, the commission shall direct payments into either the 
Second Injury Fund or the Uninsured Employers' Fund as may be 
required so as to maintain the Uninsured Employers' Fund at or near 
$500,000. Before payment into either fund, the $30,000 shall be re-
duced by the amount of any weekly compensation payments paid to or 
due the deceased between the date of the accident and death. If a 
dependency claim is filed subsequent to the issuance of such an order 
and, thereafter, a determination of dependency is made by the commis-
sion, the award shall first be paid out of the sum deposited for credit to 
the Uninsured Employers' Fund or the Second Injury Fund by the 
employer or insurance carrier before any further claim may be asserted 
against the employer or insurance carrier. If no dependency claim is 
filed within one year from the date of death, the commission's tempo-
rary order shall become permanent and final. If no temporary order 
has been issued and no claim for dependency has been filed within one 
year from the date of death, the commission may issue a permanent 
order at any time requiring the carrier or employer to pay $30,000 into 
the Second Injury Fund. Any claim for compensation by a dependent 
must be filed with the commission within one year from the date of 
death of the deceased. 
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(2) (a) Every admitted insurer writing workers' compensation insurance 
in this state, including the Workers' Compensation fund of Utah under 
Chapter 3, Title 35, shall pay to the state tax commission, on or before 
March 31 in each year, a tax of between 3V4% and 3l/4%1of the total 
premiums received by it from workers' compensation insurance in this 
state during the preceding calendar year. The percentage of premium 
applicable in any given year shall be determined by the Industrial 
. Commission at least 90 days prior to the payment date, and any per-
centage of premium over ZlU% shall reflect the reasonable reserves 
necessary to maintain the Uninsured Employers' Fund provided for in 
§ 35-1-107 in an actuarially sound financial condition. This taxable 
premium shall be reduced in the same manner as provided in Subsec-
tions (l)(a) and (1Kb), but not as provided in Subsection (l)(c). The 
State Tax Commission shall remit from the tax collected under this 
subsection an amount equal to 3% of the premium to the Second Injury 
Fund created under Subsection 35-1-68(1), XU% of the premium to the 
General Fund, and any remaining applicable percentage of the pre-
mium to the Uninsured Employers' Fund created under § 35-1-107. No 
tax that is to be transferred into the General Fund may be collected on 
premiums received from Utah public agencies. 
(b) Effective July 1, 1987, the variable tax provided in Subsection 
(2)(a) shall be replaced by a flat tax of ZlU%. 
This is a misprint in text. Should read "a tax of 
between 3 1/4% and 3 3/4% of the total..." Additionally, 
this provision is as amended. The prior provision, in 
effect at time of accident, did not provide for any 
premium tax payable to the Uninsured Employers' Fund or 
the Default Indemnity Fund. 
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THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF UTAH 
Case No. 85000966 
MARK PUGH, 
Applicant, 
vs. 
BRUCE RING (Uninsured); 
DENNIS JACOBSEN and/or 
STATE INSURANCE FUND; and 
DEFAULT INDEMNITY FUND, 
Defendants. 
* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * 
* 
* 
* 
* 
* 
* 
* 
* 
* 
* 
* 
* 
* 
* * 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
AND ORDER 
HEARING: 
BEFORE: 
APPEARANCES: 
Hearing Room 334, Industrial Commission of Utah, 160 
East 300 South, Salt Lake City, Utah, on March 19, 
1986, at 1:00 p.m.; same being pursuant to Order and 
Notice of the Commission. 
Richard G. Sumsion, Administrative Law Judge. 
The Applicant was present and represented by Phillip 
B. Shell, Attorney at Law. 
The Defendant Bruce Ring was represented by Joseph C. 
Foley, Attorney at Law. 
The Defendants Dennis Jacobsen and/or State Insurance 
Fund were represented by Dennis V. Lloyd, Attorney at 
Law. 
The Defendant Default Indemnicy Fund was represented 
by Suzan Pixton, Administrator. 
The principal issue in this case is whether the case is subject to 
the provisions of Section 35-1-42, U.C.A. 
FINDINGS OF FACT: 
1. It is uncontroverted that the Applicant, Mark Pugh, was employed 
as a laborer/carpenterfs helper by Bruce Ring at $5.50 an hour. His average 
weekly wage is controverted, and there are no payroll records available that 
would assist the Commission in a more precise determination of the Applicant's 
weekly wage, but Mr. Ring certified that he paid the Applicant a total of 
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$1,353.50 over a ten-week period. Because the Applicant started at $5.00 an 
hour and was earning $5.50 an hour at the time or his injury, it is reasonable 
to assume that he was averaging about thirty hoikrs a week. Consequently, the 
Administrative Law Judge finds in the absence of more precise documentation 
that the Applicants average weekly wage at the time of his injury was $165.00 
a week. 
2* The Applicant's industrial accident J is not controverted. He and 
Mr. Ring were on ladders in the process of putting up a beam. He tried to 
move the ladder a little bit to get in a better position, but the ladder 
slipped, causing him to fall. Just as the Applicant was trying to get up 
after his fall, Mr. Ring fell on him. The Applicant immediately experienced 
numbness in his right arm and had pain in his neck* 
3. The Applicant went to the Veterans 
next morning, where his neck was x-rayed and he 
surgery* A cervical fusion was performed on October 7. The Applicant was off 
work until January 1, 1986, when he obtained employment doing janitorial work. 
4* The Applicant is currently working and has apparently had a good 
Administration Hospital the 
was informed that he needed 
result from his surgery* He indicates that his 
too early to assign a permanent partial impairment rating 
doctor believes it is still 
5* The evidence is clear^ that the Applicant was employed by 
Bruce Ring, who was working as a subcontractor tip, a job for Dennis Jacobsen, 
the general contractor. This was a residential Construction job involving an 
addition to a house located on the avenues. Mr. Ring had submitted a bid on 
this job in accordance with the blueprints and specifications and was the 
successful low bidder. He had hired the Applicant to assist him in the com-
pletion of this project* It appears rather clear from the testimony given at 
the. time of hearing that Mr* Ring had formerly been employed by Mr. Jacobsen 
as an employee but in recent months had been working as a subcontractor on 
various jobs obtained by Mr. Jacobsen. 
6* It was Mr. Jacobsen*s practice to subcontract approximately 
80 percent of the work involved in a given job that he took on as a general 
contractor. Neither Mr. Ring nor Mr. Jacobsen are journeyman carpenters, but 
both have worked a number of years learning tt^e construction trade on an 
on-the-job basis. There is no evidence that 
proficient as a carpenter than Mr. Ring. In fact,| 
in his own opinion Mr. Ring if anything was more 
is also clear from the record that Mr. Ring was 
specifications and that he had bid this job on a 
that no employee-employer relationship exists 
Mr. Jacobsen was any more 
Mr* Jacobsen testified that 
proficient than he was. It 
working from blueprints and 
Contract basis. It is clear 
at this time between 
Mr. Jacobsen and Mr. Ring, and it is equally clekr that an employee-employer 
relationship did exist between Mr. Ring and the Applicant. As an uninsured 
employer, Mr. Ring is in no way freed from the responsibilities placed upon 
him under the Workers' Compensation Act as an employer. He is personally 
liable to the Applicant for the benefits provided under the Workers' 
Compensation Act. 
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Discussion 
The primary issue presented to the Commission in this case is whether 
or not the Defendant Dennis Jacobsen is jointly and severally liable with 
Bruce Ring for the compensation due the Applicant under the provisions of 
Section 35-1-42, U.C.A. This Section recognizes a responsibility on the part 
of employers generally to provide protection to employees who may sustain 
on-the-job injuries as a result of an industrial accident. The statute does 
not change the legal relationship of employee-employer but does impose 
statutory liability in certain cases where the 
employer procures any work to be done wholly or in part for 
him by a contractor over whose work he retains supervision or 
control, and such work is a part or process in the trade or 
business of the employer . . . . (Section 35-1-42, U.C.A.) 
In this case, there is no doubt that the subcontract work being done by 
Mr. Ring was part or process in the trade or business of Mr. Jacobsen as the 
general contractor. The statute extends coverage to 
all persons employed by him [the general contractor], and all 
subcontractors under him, and all persons employed by any 
such subcontractors . . . . (Section 35-1-42, U.C.A.) 
The basic philosophy of the statutory employer statutes enacted in most states 
is 
to protect employees of irresponsible and uninsured sub-
contractors by imposing ultimate liability on the presumably 
responsible principal contractor, who has it within his 
power, in choosing subcontractors, to pass upon their 
responsibility and insist upon appropriate compensation 
protection for their workers. (See Larson, Workmen * s 
Compensation Law. Section 49.11 at 9-12 [1982].) 
In the recent case of Pinter Construction Company v. Clifford P. Frisby, 678 
P.2d 305 (1984), the Utah Supreme Court quoted with approval a statement made 
by the Arizona Supreme Court that 
[this section] is a legislatively created scheme by which 
conceded non-employees are deliberately brought within the 
coverage of the [Workmen's Compensation] Act. 
In the Frisby case, the Court also quoted with approval the Arizona case of 
Nochta v. Industrial Commission, 7 Ariz. App. 166, 436 P.2d 944 (1968), in 
which it stated: 
The evidence is clear in the instant case that the respondent 
construction company exercised that degree of control over 
the job to be performed by the petitioner sufficient to bring 
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petitioner within the meaning of Section 23-902, subsec. B. 
They provided the material that he ^as to use; the job 
superintendent together with the architect made inspections 
of the job and there were consultations; but the final and 
exclusive control of the job was vested in the job super-
intendent. The fact that petitioner was knowledgeable and 
trusted in his field does not lessen! the ultimate control 
over the job by the job superintendent* 
There is no evidence that Jacobsen provided any material used by Ring 
in this job, but in all other respects the foregoing case is analogous to the 
instant case. Ring testified that he considered himself to be totally subject 
to the control of Jacobsen in the completion of this project. This was not 
because he looked to Jacobsen for expertise on how to do the job, but that the 
ultimate job had to be performed to the satisfaction of the owner and the 
architect and that there was almost daily input by Jacobsen in this regard and 
in regard to the ultimate completion of the project. 
7. In keeping with the perceived application of the Frisby case to 
the facts of the instant case, the Administrative Law Judge finds there was 
sufficient direction and control on the part of Jacobsen to render Ring and 
his employees "statutory employees*' under the provisions of Section 35-1-42. 
The Administrative Law Judge acknowledges that this decision might well be 
inconsistent with the Court's decjsipn in the Graham case rendered just two 
weeks prior to the Frisby decision; but because the Frisby decision is the 
latter of the two, the Administrative Law Judge presumes that it reflects the 
prevailing opinion of the Utah Supreme Court. 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW; 
The Applicant is entitled to workers' compensation benefits from the 
Defendant Bruce Ring in accordance with the foregoing Findings of Fact. The 
Defendant Dennis Jacobsen is jointly and severally liable for the payment of 
these benefits as a statutory employer under the provisions of Section 
35-1-42. If the Defendant Ring is unable to comply with the provisions of 
this Order within ten days from the date hereof, the Defendant Jacobsen and/or 
the State Insurance Fund will be liable for payment of the same with a right 
of subrogation against the Defendant Ring for reimbursement. Any determina-
tion of permanent partial impairment should be deferred until the Applicant's 
condition has been certified and a permanent partial impairment rating 
solicited from his treating physician or provided as a result of some other 
independent evaluation. 
ORDER: 
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that the Defendant Bruce Ring pay Applicant 
compensation at the rate of $165.00 per week for thirteen weeks or a total of 
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$2,145.00 as compensation for temporary total disability resulting from the 
Applicant's industrial accident of October 2, 1985, and interest at 8 percent 
per annum in the sum of $73.92. 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Defendant Bruce Ring pay all medical 
expenses incurred as the result of this accident, said expenses to be paid in 
accordance with the Medical and Surgical Fee Schedule of this Commission. 
Said expenses pertain solely to medical expenses and do not include charges 
for nursing home facilities which the Applicant was provided. 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Defendant Bruce Ring pay to Phillip B. 
Shell the sum of $429.00 as an interim attorney's fee for services rendered in 
this proceeding, the same to be deducted from the aforesaid award. 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that a determination of the Applicant's 
permanent partial impairment, if any, be deferred until his condition has 
stabilized and a rating has.been provided. 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that in the event the Defendant Bruce Ring 
fails to comply with the provisions of this Order within ten days of the date 
hereof, that all amounts payable by said Defendant shall be paid by the 
Defendant Dennis Jacobsen and/or the State Insurance Fund with full rights of 
subroga- tion against the Defendant Bruce Ring for reimbursement. 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that any Motion for Review of the foregoing 
shall be filed in writing within fifteen (15) days of the date hereof, 
specifying in detail the particular errors and objections, and unless so 
filed, this Order shall be final and not subject to review or appeal. 
Richard G. Sumsion 
Administrative Law Judge 
Passed by thet Industrial Commission 
of Utah, Salt Lake City, Utah, this 
#6^ day of March, 1986. 
ATTEST: 
' Linda J. Strasburg // 
Commission Secretary 
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THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF UTAH 
Case No. 85000966 
MARK PUGH, 
Applicant, 
vs. 
BRUCE RING 
(UNINSURED) 
DENNIS JACOBSEN and/or 
STATE INSURANCE FUND and 
DEFAULT INDEMNITY FUND, 
Defendants. 
* 
* 
* 
* 
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* 
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On March 26, 1986, an Administrative Law Judge of the Commission 
issued Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and an Order awarding the 
Applicant in the above captioned case temporary total compensation* and medical 
expenses. The Applicant suffered an on-the-job fall on October 2, 1983. At 
the time of the fall, the Applicant was employed by the Defendant, Bruce Ring, 
as a laborer/carpenter. The Applicant and Ring were performing work for the 
Defendant/general contractor, Dennis Jacobsen, when the accident occurred. On 
that date, Ring was not insured for workers' compensation and Jacobsen was 
insured with the State Insurance Fund. The Administrative Law Judge found 
that Ring and Jacobsen*s insurer, the State Insurance Fund, were jointly and 
severally liable for the benefits awarded the Applicant. On April 21, 1986, 
the Defendant/State Insurance Fund filed a Motion for Review contesting the 
joint and several liability, and arguing that Ring was the employer and should 
be held liable for the workers' compensation benefits. The State Insurance 
Fund states that if Ring was uninsured at the date of accident and is now 
insolvent, that the Default Indemnity Fund should pay any benefits awarded. 
The Commission is of the opinion that the Administrative Law Judge correctly 
awarded benefits as against Ring and the State Insurance Fund, and that the 
Default Indemnity Fund is not liable to pay benefits in this matter. 
In its Motion for Review, the State Insurance Fund argues that the 
Administrative Law Judge incorrectly applied the "statutory employer" provi-
sion of U. C. A. 35-1-42, to the facts in this case. That provision reads as 
follows: 
"Where any employer procures any work to be done wholly or 
in part for him by a contractor over whose work he retains 
supervision or control, and such work is a part or process 
ORDER DENYING 
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in the trade or business of the employer, such contractor, 
and persons employed by him, and all 
him, and all persons employed by any 
shall be deemed, within the meaning of this section, 
employees of such original employer.'* 
subcontractors under 
such subcontractors, 
The Administrative Law Judge found th^t Jacobsen retained supervision 
or control over the work performed by Ring, and that Ring's work was a part or 
process of Jacobsen*s trade or business. Therefore, per U. C. A. 35-1-42, the 
Administrative Law Judge found that the Applicant was both an employee of Ring r. and also an employee of Jacobsen, causing Ring]and Jacobsen to be jointly and 
severally liable for the Applicant's benefits. 
The State Insurance Fund argues that the facts show that Jacobsen did 
not retain supervision or control over Ring, and that Ring's carpentry work 
was not a part or process of Jacobsen*s project management business. Regarding 
the supervision and control, the State Insurance! Fund cites particular pages of 
the hearing transcript for testimony which indicates Ring acted independently 
and without the supervison or control of Jacobsen. The State Insurance Fund 
notes Ring provided his own tools (p. 34), hired his own labor (p. 36), and 
that Jacobsen gave no instructions to Ring with respect to the performance of 
the carpentry and did no carpentry himself (p. 35 and 57). Also.noted was the 
fact that Jacobsen did not direct Ring's starting or stopping time for work 
(p. 50), and the fact that Ring was free to work other jobs (p. 35). The 
State Insurance Fund concludes these facts show no control or supervision by 
Jacobsen over Ring, and therefore, U. C. A. 35-1-42, is not applicable and 
Ring alone is responsible for the Applicant's benefits (as he alone was the 
Applicant's employer). The State Insurance Funa also argues that Ring's car-
pentry is not a part or process of Jacobsen's project management business as 
project management does not necessarily involve Carpentry. 
The Commission has reviewed the hearing transcript, and finds that 
the testimony cited by the State Insurance Fund does support a finding of 
limited control on the part of Jacobsen. However, other testimony seems to 
point towards more than just limited control. There is testimony that 
Jacobsen had some voice in how many employees Ring needed, and some voice in 
whether or not those employed by Ring were performing up to standard (p. 39 
and 41). Jacobsen himself conceded, and Ring and the Applicant also testified 
to the fact that Jacobsen was at the job site where Ring and the Applicant 
worked, two to five times a week, and that Jacobsen supervised and directed 
changes while there. Jacobsen also conceded he occasionally spent the entire 
day at the job (p. 28, 29, 30, and 52). Also, even though Ring may have been 
free to work for other contractors, he, in fact I did not. These factors in-
dicate the higher degree of control associated with an employment relationship. 
Similarly, there is evidence that carpentry was, in fact, more often than not 
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a part and process of Jacobsen's business. Jacobsen himself testified he did 
not always contract out the carpentry and did some carpentry himself (p 55). 
With the respect to the "part or process" issue, the Commission is 
satisfied that there is sufficient evidence to show carpentry was a part or 
process of Jacobsen's business. There has been no real argument or evidence 
to the contrary. With respect to the control issue, it is clear that there is 
evidence pointing to very little control as well as evidence of a higher 
degree of control. Because of this, the Commission feels it is appropriate to 
look at the case law cited by both the Administrative Law Judge and the State" 
Insurance Fund. L. Jack Graham v. R. Thome Foundation and State Insurance 
Fund, 6 75 P. 2d 1196 (Utah 1984) is a case where the Supreme Court found 
insufficient control or supervision to apply U. C. A. 35-1-42, and hold the 
general contractor to be an employer. The Court looked at some of the same 
factors as have been pointed out by the State Insurance Fund in the instant 
case, such as the ownership of the tools by the subcontractor, the fact that 
the subcontractor was free to contract elsewhere, and the fact the subcontrac-
tor worked his own schedule. However, two factors noted by the Court in 
Graham demonstrate that that case involved much less control and supervison 
than does the instant case. In Graham, the subcontractor worked^ for several 
other contractors while he worked for Thorne, and during one month, actually 
worked only three days for Thorne and worked the rest of the month for other 
contractors. In the instant case, Ring worked for Jacobsen alone, full time. 
Also, in the Graham case, the contractor knew very little about the work he 
hired Graham to perform, therefore, he was not competent to supervise Grahamfs 
work except in a very general way. Once again, this is not true in the instant 
case, where Jacobsen knew carpentry, and therefore, could and did supervise 
the work performed. 
In the other case cited by the Administrative Law Judge and the State 
Insurance Fund, Pinter Construction Company v. Clifford P. Frisby, 678 P. 2d 
305 (Utah 1984), the Court found a minimal amount of control to be sufficient 
for purposes of applying the "statutory employer" provisions of U. C. A. 
35-1-42. Concern for meeting the deadline, and the resultant directions to 
the subcontractor to hurry, is the only factor of control noted by the Court. 
The Commission finds much more evidence of control in the instant case, and in 
viewing the Court's interpretation of sufficient control in Frisby, finds 
Jacobsen had sufficient control over Ring so as to invoke the "statutory 
employer" provision of U. C. A. 35-1-42. Furthermore, the Court's decision in 
Graham demonstrates that less control than is indicated in the instant case is 
necessary before it can be found that U. C. A. 35-1-42, is not applicable. 
The Graham facts show not only no control by the Contractor, but also an in-
ability to supervise because of unfamiliarity with the work the subcontractor 
was performing. Those facts are clearly distinguishable from the facts of the 
instant case, and so the Commission must conclude the instant case is an 
appropriate case for application of the "statutory employer" provision of U. 
C. A. 35-1-42. 
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With respect to the State Insurance Fund's argument that the Default 
Indemnity Fund should pay any benefits due the Applicant should Ring be 
insolvent, the Commission feels that the existence of the Default Indemnity 
Fund does not preclude application of U. C. A. 35-1-42. The Commission finds 
that if the legislature had wanted the Default Indemnity Fund to take the 
place of "statutory" employers, the legislature would have repealed the 
"statutory employer" section of U. C. A. 35-1+42, when the Default Indemnity 
Fund legislation was passed. As the legislature did not do so, the Commission 
finds the Default Indemnity Fund was not intended to replace statutory 
employers. In conclusion, the Commission finds that there is no Default-
Indemnity Fund liability in this matter, and that the Administrative Law Judge 
correctly applied U. C. A. 35-1-42, to the facts of this case. Therefore, the 
Defendants, Ring and the State Insurance Fuiid, are jointly and severally 
liable for the benefits awarded to the Applicant in the Administrative Law 
Judge1s March 26, 1986 Order. 
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that the Defendant/State Insurance Fund's 
April 21, 1986 Motion for Review is denied, and! *-V»P Administrative Law Judge's 
March 26, 1986 Order is hereby affirmed. 
Lenice^L 
Commissioner 
Passed by the Industrial Commission 
of Utjrtv, Sa l t Lake City , Utah, t h i s 
jiay of June, 1986. 
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